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According to the dictionary definition, social science focuses on understanding “the institutions and function-ing of human society and […] the interpersonal relation-
ships of individuals as members of society.”1 The phrase ‘social 
science genetics’ might, therefore, appear oxymoronic, as genetics 
traditionally focuses on phenomena (such as the translation of 
DNA sequence differences into proteins) that are squarely outside 
the typical purview of the social sciences. As an economist and a 
psychologist who both study human behaviour and social phe-
nomena, such as people’s risky behaviours, we would consider the 
actions and interactions among subatomic particles as obviously 
irrelevant to our work—what do quarks have to do with under-
standing, for example, who starts a new business? What, then, 
makes DNA any different?
The difference is that decades of twin research—and more recent 
research using genome-wide measures of DNA—have shown that 
nearly every aspect of human individual differences is partly heri-
table2,3. That is, differences between people in their personality, 
educational attainment, income, risk tolerance, well-being, occupa-
tional choice, financial decision-making, political ideology, sexual 
behaviour, physical and psychiatric health, longevity and num-
ber of children are all affected in some way by differences in their 
inherited DNA sequence variation3–6. Genetic differences between 
people, therefore, have incontrovertible relevance for all branches of 
the social sciences that are concerned with or affected by individual 
differences in behaviour and outcomes.
Research to identify specific genes associated with human 
individual differences has made tremendous progress in the past 
decade5. Much of this work has focused on health outcomes, but 
these developments have begun to influence the social sciences as 
well7. Attempts to link genetics to social and behavioural outcomes 
are often met with greater scepticism and concerns about potential 
consequences than medical applications of genetic research (Box 1)8. 
These concerns have to be taken seriously, because they are based 
on a long, troublesome history of abusing genetic research to jus-
tify discrimination and atrocities, including forced sterilization and 
even genocide. Continued vigilance about the misappropriation of 
genetics is necessary (Box 2).
We believe that modern social science genetics can and should 
play a central role in combatting this misappropriation by showcas-
ing the myriad ways in which genetic and environmental factors are 
entangled with each other and interact. Furthermore, integrating 
molecular genetics into the social sciences can deliver richer, more 
precise answers to old questions in psychology, sociology, econom-
ics and related fields. Ultimately, the greatest impact from integrat-
ing genetics into the social sciences will probably not come from 
simply applying new tools to old questions, but from changing how 
people think about the world around them, allowing them to ask 
new questions and to pursue new answers that would not have been 
feasible before. For example, the realization that success in life is 
partly the result of a genetic lottery raises new questions not only 
about underlying mechanisms, but also about fairness and what a 
desirable distribution of wealth in a society should look like. In this 
sense, genetics is akin to other new tools that have made inroads 
into the social sciences in the past few decades (for example, experi-
ments, game theory or neuroscience), all of which have contributed 
to a more realistic understanding of human behaviour and the 
functioning of societies.
In this review, we will describe the main tools of statisti-
cal genetics, discuss some of the underlying assumptions and 
implications of these tools, and illustrate their current use in the 
social sciences with concrete examples. We restrict our discourse 
here to genetics but note that there is also a growing literature 
that uses other types of biological data (for example, the metabo-
lome, the epigenome, hormones, neurotransmitters) to address 
social-scientific research questions.
The toolbox of statistical genetics
The ambition to bring the insights and tools of genetics into 
the social sciences is not new. For decades, behavioural genetics 
(a psychology-focused subfield of the larger field of social sci-
ence genetics) has been estimating the heritability of psychologi-
cal traits, such as personality, intelligence and psychopathology3. 
The conclusion of this line of research was simple: everything is 
heritable2, even ostensibly ‘environmental’ variables such as life 
stress, divorce or harsh parenting. The ubiquitous heritability of 
individual differences can pose a serious threat to inferences about 
the impact of specific environments, as these environments, par-
ticularly when they are provided by genetic relatives of the focal 
person, cannot be considered exogenous to the genotype of the 
person9. This critique continues to be important. Now, the com-
bination of genetic data and family data (for example, genotyped 
samples of trios) offers exciting new possibilities to tackle this and 
many other challenges10,11.
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Genome-wide association studies. Thanks to rapid technological 
progress, people can now be cheaply genotyped on arrays that mea-
sure specific DNA sequences that commonly vary between people. 
This advance has led to the emergence of large-scale biobanks12 and 
consumer genetics companies13, explosively increasing the sample 
sizes available for genetic research5. As sample sizes increased, 
human molecular genetics and social science genetics went through 
a painful—but, ultimately, highly productive—paradigm change. 
During the mid-2000s, many researchers embraced a ‘candidate 
gene’ approach, focusing on a small handful of genetic variants 
that were selected on the basis of a  priori reasoning about their 
possible functional significance. However, as genotyping became 
cheaper and more people were genotyped, it became clear that 
most studies reporting associations between single genetic variants 
and behavioural phenotypes did not replicate7,14. Clearly, something 
was wrong.
But thanks to growing data availability, an alternative approach 
became feasible: genome-wide association studies (GWAS). A 
GWAS systematically scans the entire genome for possible asso-
ciations with an outcome, examining millions of single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs), i.e., variations in individual DNA ‘letters’, 
or base pairs. GWASs are typically conducted in samples with simi-
lar ancestries, most commonly people of European descent (Box 2). 
Researchers run a separate regression of the outcome of interest 
on each SNP separately to deal with the fact that there are typically 
many more SNPs than individuals in a particular dataset, thereby 
ignoring any correlations between SNPs (i.e., linkage disequilib-
rium or LD15). This approach yields some association signal from 
all observed SNPs that are in LD with potentially causal genetic 
variants, which may or may not be observed directly in the available 
genetic data16.
GWASs typically control for technical parameters, sex, age and, 
importantly, multiple principal components (PCs) of the genetic 
data, which are supposed to act as proxies for historical migration 
patterns and long-term ancestry (i.e., genetic population structure)17. 
This is intended to control for spurious genetic associations with 
outcomes that vary for non-genetic reasons in sub-populations that 
also vary in gene frequencies. Large-scale GWAS initiatives are often 
based on preregistered analysis plans; they rigorously control for 
multiple testing by imposing extremely stringent P value thresholds, 
Box 1 | Three common concerns about social science genetics
Do social scientists have the training to work with genetic 
data?
The word ‘genetics’ might conjure up scientific activities that 
most social scientists consider alien to their training. But the uses 
of genetic data that lend themselves most readily to social science 
research actually resemble the typical tools of social science, with 
a heavy reliance on statistical methods and natural experiments. 
Unfortunately, social scientists still often miss training on how 
they can utilize genetic data and methods. Curricula that fill 
these knowledge gaps are needed, and graduate programs at an 
increasing number of top research universities are moving in this 
direction.
Does genetic research imply bio-determinism?
The goal of the natural sciences is often to identify universal 
‘laws of nature’ that are invariant across time and place. In 
contrast, nearly all of the causal regularities discovered by social 
scientists are (i) probabilistic rather than deterministic and (ii) 
exception-ridden rather than universal. The observation that 
human behaviour is influenced by genetic differences between 
people should not be misinterpreted as bio-determinism92. 
Although DNA variants do not change after conception, their 
potential influence on social and behavioural outcomes can vary 
across different environments.
Is genetic research a threat to social justice?
A major obstacle to admitting genetics into the social sciences 
is fear that their integration “runs along a knife edge, with 
cliffs of eugenic risk on either side.”8 This fear is well-founded, 
as genetic research has been used to justify numerous crimes 
against humanity104. But, as the political philosopher John Rawls 
summarized,105 “The natural distribution is neither just nor 
unjust…. These are simply natural facts. What is just and unjust is 
the way that institutions deal with these facts.” We would expand 
this idea: which genetic variants are present in which people, and 
what they do within a person’s cellular machinery, are natural 
facts. How these genetic variants are associated, in a particular 
time and a particular place, with outcomes such as education or 
wealth are social facts. How these natural and social facts should 
be used—by governments, schools, businesses, hospitals, etc.—is 
the appropriate locus of social justice concerns.
Box 2 | Genetics and scientific racism
Scientific racism invokes genetic differences to explain racial dis-
parities in health, wealth, power and life opportunities as inevita-
ble and insurmountable106,107. Peeling apart genetic inquiry from 
scientific racism requires attention to four important points:
Race and genetic ancestry are not the same thing.
Racial and ethnic categories are correlated with genetic ancestry, 
but race is not reducible to genetics108. The US Census categories 
for race and ethnicity do not have a neat 1:1 correspondence with 
genetic diversity. More importantly, what is considered a ‘race’ is 
socially defined and culturally specific109.
Genetic research has a profound Eurocentric bias.
The vast majority of social science research is conducted with 
“the WEIRDest people in the world” (Western, educated, 
industrialized, rich, and democratic)110, and social science 
genetics is no exception. Over 75% of participants in GWAS are 
from European populations, and the exclusion of non-European 
participants from genomic research has the potential to 
exacerbate health disparities111.
Polygenic scores are not comparable or perfectly portable 
across ancestry groups.
If the environments of two groups are not identical, the same 
genetic endowment may give rise to drastically different 
outcomes. And, differences in ancestry can lead to differences 
in LD patterns and minor allele frequencies, such that GWAS 
results from one ancestry group are, at best, only partially 
portable to another. For example, a PGS that captures 
approximately 11% of the variation of educational attainment in 
white Americans captures only about 2% of the variation among 
African Americans34. Neither can average PGSs be meaningfully 
compared across populations112.
Geneticists have a special responsibility to communicate their 
results responsibly.
Extremist groups pay close attention to developments in genetic 
research and can sometimes show a surprising level of technical 
sophistication113. Given the potential for rampant and pernicious 
misinformation, researchers have an ethical responsibility to 
communicate those results clearly to the general public114.
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and they typically report replication results for novel findings based 
on evidence from different, independently collected samples in 
the same paper. All of the above dramatically decrease the risk of 
finding false positives in GWAS compared to earlier candidate 
gene studies.
The first GWASs of social scientific outcomes delivered hum-
bling results, either coming up empty-handed or only finding a 
few genes, each of which accounted for mere fractions of a percent 
of variance18. This ostensible failure, however, was key to under-
standing why the candidate gene approach was flawed: social and 
behavioural outcomes, like fertility, education, personality and 
risk-taking, are massively polygenic19. That is, they are influenced 
by thousands upon thousands of genetic loci scattered throughout 
the genome, each with a tiny effect. In contrast, candidate gene 
studies were operating under the wrong assumption that a few genes 
with large effects are responsible for the heritability of most traits, 
and they were therefore conducted with sample sizes that were 
hopelessly underpowered19.
Over the past 5 years, GWAS sample sizes have rapidly grown 
from tens of thousands to millions. As a result of this growing sta-
tistical power to detect tiny effects on highly polygenic traits, the 
GWAS approach has now yielded hundreds of replicable associa-
tions of specific genetic markers with social scientific outcomes5,6. 
The flood of discoveries had motivated big online repositories20 and 
interactive atlases comparing the genetic architecture of thousands 
of traits21,22. Scientists are (finally) beginning to open the black box 
of heritability23.
However, the threat of finding spurious genetic associations due 
to unobserved variable bias remains a serious challenge24–26. There 
is no guarantee that using samples with similar ancestry and adding 
genetic PCs as control variables will eliminate all forms of spuri-
ous genetic signal. For example, genetic PCs don’t capture rare vari-
ants that are only weakly correlated with common SNPs, they seem 
to perform less well in small samples24, and they can both under- 
and over-control for potential confounds that are associated with 
genetic variation among people27.
New statistical methods are constantly being developed to tackle 
the challenge of spurious associations more rigorously, such as 
linear mixed models (which were previously used in the animal 
breeding literature)28,29. Yet even the most advanced methods rely 
on assumptions such as additivity that can be violated in practice. 
The gold standard to correct for confounds in genetic association 
studies is a research design that uses family data and exploits the 
random assortment of alleles during meiosis for the identification 
of causal genetic effects (for example, using dizygotic twins, sib-
lings with the same biological parents, or trios of mother–father–
child)10,30. The availability of such data keeps growing and will 
enable within-family GWAS and follow-up analyses for many heri-
table traits in the future. At the moment, however, the vast majority 
of GWAS are based on population samples or case–control cohorts 
that are not entirely immune to unobserved variable bias.
Genetic correlations. GWAS data makes it possible to calculate 
genetic correlations, including, surprisingly, between pairs of traits 
that have never been measured in the same sample. Specifically, 
the technique of bivariate LD-score regression uses the GWAS 
summary statistics from two traits to estimate co-heritability in a 
remarkably robust way31,32. As an illustration, Fig. 1 summarizes 
genetic correlations between educational attainment (EA) and a 
variety of other traits from LDHub, an online repository of genetic 
correlations33. EA-associated genes34 are associated with traits across 
the lifespan, from birthweight (+), infant head circumference (+) 
and childhood IQ (+), to body mass index (BMI)-related traits (–), 
depressive symptoms (–), neuroticism (–), smoking (–) in adult-
hood, all the way to risk for lung cancer (–), Alzheimer’s disease (–) 
and longevity (+) (as implied by parent’s age at death). However, the 
effects of EA-increasing genes are not universally positive: they are 
also linked to reduced reproductive success (fewer children born, 
most likely due to reproductive decisions rather than decreased 
fecundity) and an increased risk for several psychiatric disorders.
These findings underscore how tightly social-scientific out-
comes, such as education, are linked with health. At the same time, 
it is important to remember that genetic correlations are not, by 
themselves, informative about causal mechanisms, nor do they nec-
essarily imply direct, ‘inside the skin’ pleiotropic effects of genes on 
two traits35. They may also reflect indirect, possibly environmen-
tally mediated pathways (for example, high childhood IQ → higher 
EA → less smoking → reduced risk for lung cancer).
Moving beyond atlases of pairwise genetic correlations, multi-
variate approaches further capitalize on genetic similarities among 
traits by jointly analysing GWAS summary statistics from several 
traits simultaneously. Multitrait analysis of GWAS (MTAG) and 
genomic structural equation modelling (genomic SEM) are two 
recently developed methods that are quickly gaining popularity36,37. 
A multivariate analyses can boost the power to detect genes asso-
ciated with a trait by ‘borrowing’ relevant information from other 
genetically related traits (for example, neuroticism as a proxy for 
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Fig. 1 | Genetic correlations of educational attainment with traits across 
the entire lifespan. Genetic correlations of EA34 with 196 traits were 
computed using bivariate LD-score regression and GWAS summary statistics 
with varying sample sizes obtained from LDHub (http://ldsc.broadinstitute.
org/ldhub/). The figure only shows a subset of all results for EA that are 
significant after Bonferroni correction (P < 0.05/196 = 2.5 × 10−4,  
two-sided tests). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. Green and 
orange represent positive and negative genetic relationships, respectively, 
between EA and health.
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depressive symptoms and vice versa)38. Other work is using mul-
tivariate GWAS to identify specific genes and biological pathways 
that confer general vulnerability to psychiatric disorders versus 
genes that operate uniquely on a specific symptom or syndrome37. 
Overall, the shift toward multivariate GWAS parallels an earlier 
development in twin studies, which shifted from estimating the 
heritability of single traits in isolation to estimating the extent to 
which the same (unobserved) genes influenced a variety of human 
phenotypes39.
Polygenic scores. Answering biological questions that might, on 
their face, appear irrelevant to social scientists (how many polymor-
phisms in the genome affect human phenotypes?) can turn out to be 
crucial for developing tools that will, in fact, be broadly useful for 
social science40. Specifically, as it has become clear that the effects 
of individual variants are tiny, methods of aggregating the effects 
of many variants into a single composite, a polygenic score (PGS), 
have proliferated. In polygenic scoring, researchers take results from 
a GWAS of a specific trait and apply them in a new sample, weight-
ing each person’s genetic variants by the effect size from the GWAS 
and summing across the variants. The resulting PGS is therefore an 
index that summarizes current estimates of additive genetic influ-
ences towards a particular phenotype41,42.
Because PGSs aggregate over many genetic markers, they cap-
ture a much larger share of the variance of the trait of interest than 
any one variant on its own. The accuracy of PGS primarily depends 
on the heritability of the trait (+), the GWAS sample size (+), the 
polygenicity of the trait (–) and whether the genetic architecture of 
the trait varies across different environments (–)41. So far, theoreti-
cal projections of the accuracy of PGS have been borne out by the 
data pretty well. Figure 2 illustrates this by comparing the theoreti-
cally expected43 predictive accuracy of a PGS in a hold-out sample 
(assuming 200,000 independent causal SNPs) with results from stud-
ies of increasing sample size for educational attainment (EA1 (ref. 44), 
EA2 (ref. 45), EA3 (ref. 34)) and body height (Height1 (ref. 46), Height2 
(ref. 47)). As GWAS sample sizes increased, the number of genome- 
wide significant loci increased from three in EA1 to 1,271 in EA3.
The R2 of the EA3 PGS mirrors the effect size seen for tradi-
tional social science variables, such as the relationship between 
family income and educational attainment. As a result, such PGSs 
are beginning to be useful for follow-up studies with much smaller 
sample sizes, including experimental studies, policy and interven-
tion studies, and longitudinal datasets with deep phenotypes48–51. A 
researcher who has a PGS that captures 5% of the variance of the 
phenotype she is interested in needs only about 260 individuals if 
she wants to have 90% statistical power at α = 0.05 (two-sided test) 
to find an association of the phenotype with that PGS.
At the same time, it is important to remember that even the best 
currently available PGS for behavioural outcomes cannot make accu-
rate predictions for the outcome of any specific individual. Figure 3 
illustrates this by plotting the EA3 PGS against actual years of school-
ing in a US sample of individuals with European ancestries. The rela-
tionship between the two variables is positive and statistically highly 
significant (P = 2.2 × 10−16, two-sided test). The PGS accounts for 
about 11% of the variance in the years of schooling after residual-
izing this variable for sex, birth year and the first ten genetic PCs. Yet 
we also see that, for almost any single value of the PGS, almost every 
level of actual education is observed. Even for PGS values that are 2 
s.d. above or below the sample mean, we observe everything from 
high school drop-outs to people with PhDs.
It is also important to remember that PGS are not a ‘clean’ way 
to separate biological from non-biological factors that contribute to 
differences in phenotypes. GWAS results are not entirely immune 
to unobserved (e.g., environmental) confounds, such as parenting 
or neighbourhood characteristics, and genetic influences are often 
conditional on and/or mediated by environmental channels52. Thus, 
PGSs may exhibit different predictive accuracy even among mem-
bers of the same ancestry group that vary from each other in sex or 
socioeconomic status53.
Nevertheless, PGS have a variety of useful and exciting applica-
tions in the social sciences, including the possibilities of adding them 
as control variables to boost statistical power in experiments44, reduce 
unobserved heterogeneity54, investigate gene–environment interac-
tions49, study environmental factors mediating the effect of genes on 
the outcome of interest55 and tease apart environmental and genetic 
channels of intergenerational transmission10,11. One particularly use-
ful aspect is that once genetic data has been collected in a sample, it is 
(in principle) possible to construct PGS in that sample for all traits for 
which GWAS have ever been conducted6, opening up the possibility 
of controlling for and investigating relationships that would have been 
practically impossible otherwise (for example, is a genetic predisposi-
tion for Alzheimer’s disease associated with brain anatomy in infancy 
or with the tendency to purchase more complete health insurance?).
Although PGS are often frustrating for biologists who are inter-
ested in specific genomic mechanisms, our perhaps-controversial 
position is that PGS can hold the most utility for social scientists, 
precisely because they aggregate across lower-level mechanisms and 
refocus inquiry back onto the behaviour of the whole human organ-
ism in her or his environment48. The feasibility of integrating PGSs 
is aided by the fact that GWAS summary statistics are often freely 
available in the public domain21. Additionally, publicly available data-
sets that include genetic information have begun to release PGS for 
several traits to researchers who do not have access to the raw genetic 
data or lack the expertise to construct the scores themselves56.
Integrating genetic data and family-based study designs. 
Although molecular genetic data is often perceived as supplanting 
twin or family designs as the workhorses of social science genetics, 
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Fig. 2 | The influence of GWaS sample size on the accuracy of polygenic 
scores for two genetically complex traits with assumed SNP heritability of 
20% and 40%. The two solid lines show theoretical expectations, assuming 
200,000 causal genetic markers for both traits. De Vlaming et al.43  
estimate the SNP heritability of height and years of schooling with  
43.3% (s.e.m. = 1.8%) and 16.4% (s.e.m. = 1.7%), respectively. In practice, 
the accuracy of polygenic scores depends on many technical parameters, 
such as the number of SNPs in the score and which prediction sample 
is used. The empirical results for years of schooling in this figure are for 
PGS based on all HapMap 3 SNPs, using the Swedish Twin Registry as a 
prediction sample for EA1 and the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) as 
a prediction sample for EA2 and EA3. The empirical results for height are 
based on the HRS prediction sample with SNP thresholds of P < 5 × 10−5 for 
Height1 and P < 0.001 for Height2 (ref. 47). All statistical tests referred to 
here were two-sided.
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structure provides the most compelling study designs52. Two types 
of family relationships are particularly noteworthy. First, dizygotic 
(DZ) twins or siblings can be used to estimate the within-family 
association between genetic variants (or PGS) and an outcome. This 
analysis takes advantage of the fact that a parent has two copies of 
each genetic locus (called alleles), and these alleles are randomly 
assigned to offspring during the process of making eggs or sperm. 
Which version of the parental genotype someone inherits, versus 
which version a sibling inherited, is the outcome of a true natural 
lottery. Because genotypes are assigned randomly with respect to all 
other variables, an association between sibling differences in PGS 
and sibling differences in phenotype is powerful evidence that the 
PGS is tapping genetic variants with a causal influence on the phe-
notype. This is a good starting point for investigating relevant causal 
mechanisms that might involve malleable environmental pathways.
Second, if genetic data for trios of mother, father and off-
spring are available, one can decompose the parental genotypes 
into two parts: the alleles transmitted to the offspring and the 
non-transmitted alleles. The non-transmitted alleles of the parent, 
then, are analogous to the genotype of an adoptive parent: if they are 
correlated with the phenotype of the offspring (an ‘indirect genetic 
effect’ or ‘genetic nurture’), this association cannot be due to genetic 
transmission from parent-to-child and must be mediated via envi-
ronmental channels, such as parenting style or socioeconomic 
advantage10. This ‘virtual parent’ design is conceptually similar to 
the logic of adoption studies or children-of-twins studies, in that 
it peels apart genetic and environmental pathways for intergenera-
tional transmission10,11. At the same time, conditional on the geno-
types of the parents, the directly transmitted alleles of the child are 
the outcome of a natural lottery that can be used for causal analyses, 
similar to the logic of within-sibling comparisons. Recent method-
ological work is considering the extent to which genetic nurture 
biases SNP-based heritability estimates and estimates from sibling 
fixed-effects models57.
Third, the combination of family-based study designs and genetic 
data offers new, powerful approaches for causal inference using 
Mendelian randomization (MR)58,59 and related approaches54,60–62. 
For example, results from large-scale GWAS on within-family dif-
ferences would be immune to potential confounds from subtle 
differences in ancestry or unobserved environmental factors that 
correlate with family genotypes, thereby ruling out an important 
source of bias in MR-like analyses63.
Substantive applications
We now turn to some examples of what we have already learnt 
from applying the social science genetics toolbox in five substan-
tive areas: (i) intergenerational transmission of human capital, 
(ii) social mobility over the lifespan, (iii) genetic associations with 
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Fig. 3 | The relationship between a polygenic score for educational attainment and actual years of schooling in the Health and retirement Study. The EA 
PGS was constructed using GWAS estimates from a sample of N = 1,123,243 individuals34. The prediction sample was restricted to individuals of European 
ancestries (N = 8,638, Health and Retirement Study). EA was measured in typical years of schooling required to obtain the highest academic degree of an 
individual. EA was residualized for birth year, sex and the first ten principal components from the genetic data, and then regressed on the polygenic score.
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demographic variables (fertility, mortality and migration), (iv) gene 
× environment interactions and (v) the interconnections between 
social processes and disease processes. These research areas are of 
broad interest to scientists working in many different fields and 
focus on aspects of human functioning that resist bio-reductionism 
and yet are illuminated with biological data.
Intergenerational transmission of human capital. Human capital 
is transmitted from generation to generation64, and understanding 
how ‘nature’ and ‘nurture’ shape children’s resemblance to their par-
ents can inform efforts to reduce inequalities that tend to persist 
over time. For example, studies of trios from several countries found 
that a PGS of the EA-associated alleles that parents did not trans-
mit to their offspring are nevertheless associated with offspring EA, 
thereby providing new evidence for the importance of environmen-
tal mechanisms and parenting10,11,65,66. Such study designs can be 
extended to identify specific environmental variables and processes 
that mediate the effects of untransmitted parental genotypes on 
their children55, thereby providing scientists with a promising new 
strategy for understanding the mechanisms that lead to inequalities 
in wealth and health.
Intragenerational social mobility. The combination of mea-
sured genotypes and family structure has also been used to exam-
ine intragenerational social mobility. In these studies, a PGS of 
education-associated genetic variants is used as a type of tracer dye: 
just as tracking the progress of ingested barium allows a radiolo-
gist to gain a higher-resolution picture of the digestive tract’s twists 
and turns, tracking individuals with a high or low PGS allows social 
scientists to gain a higher-resolution picture of the life-course 
twists and turns that ultimately produce high or low social attain-
ments in adulthood. The developmental pathways toward greater 
social mobility are already evident early in childhood: the EA PGS 
is also associated with earlier achievement of developmental mile-
stones and faster reading development51. Looking across the lifes-
pan, people born with a higher number of EA variants show greater 
upward mobility, relative to their family-of-origin, in occupational 
status, income and educational attainment, even compared to their 
siblings67. The EA PGS is also associated with wealth at retirement, 
with a 1 s.d. increase in PGS estimated to be worth $137,000 in 2010 
dollars. This wealth association persists even controlling for edu-
cation and labour income, and it operates in part through better 
financial decision-making68.
Evidence that children’s genotypes are associated with their edu-
cations, occupations and financial success in adulthood should not 
be interpreted to mean that children are genetically determined 
to be rich or poor (Box 1). And, following Holland’s distinction 
between the ‘effects of causes’ versus the ‘causes of effects’69, reverse 
inferences that people are poor because of their genetics are entirely 
unwarranted. In fact, evidence from five longitudinal studies across 
three continents showed that children from rich families with low 
PGS scores still have more socioeconomic success as adults than 
children from poor families with high PGS scores67.
Genetics and demography: fertility, mortality, migration. Over 
generations, fertility, mortality and migration shape the size and 
genetic distribution of a population. At the same time, genetic dif-
ferences within a population are associated with all three of these key 
demographic variables. Twin studies have long established that time 
to reproductive maturity, reproductive behaviour and completed 
fertility are all heritable70, and more recently, large-scale GWASs 
have found multiple specific loci associated with fertility-relevant 
traits and behaviours71–73. Genetic research on fertility has been used 
to illuminate the mechanisms underlying the association between 
parental age and offspring risk for mental disease, as genetic risk 
for schizophrenia has been associated with both early and late age 
at first birth74,75. Earlier work using children-of-twins similarly sug-
gested that part of the elevated burden of mental health problems in 
children of adolescent mothers was due to transmission of genetic 
liabilities affecting both fertility behaviours and psychopathology76.
One active and politically sensitive area of research is the rela-
tionship between education and fertility. Genetic variants asso-
ciated with education are also associated with a lower number of 
children born, resulting in declines in the average EA PGS in the 
20th century77,78. A variety of twin and family studies have probed 
whether education operates causally to delay childbearing and sex-
ual behaviour, above and beyond shared genetic influences, with 
mixed results79,80. Interestingly, two variables that are heritable and 
have robust epidemiological associations with fertility behaviour—
marital history81 and religiousness82—have received almost no 
attention in molecular genetic research and represent an untapped 
opportunity for integrating genetics into classic questions in the 
social sciences.
At the other end of the lifespan, some genetic loci have also been 
discovered for mortality risk, as imputed by the lifespan of one’s 
parents83. Finally, migration, either to another country or within a 
country, has turned out to be linked to genetic differences in intrigu-
ing, and sometimes troubling, ways. People with a higher PGS for 
EA were found to be more likely to immigrate to other countries 
from New Zealand or to leave former coal-mining areas in the UK, 
perhaps to seek better educational and occupational opportunities 
elsewhere51,84. In contrast, people who stayed behind in economi-
cally depressed coal mining regions in the UK tend to have lower 
EA PGS and also carry more genetic risk factors for obesity, smok-
ing and coronary artery disease84. In fact, genetic differences across 
geographical regions in the UK are so systematic that one can con-
duct a GWAS on neighbourhood characteristics (for example, the 
Townsend index, a measure derived from registry data that reflects 
regional variation in over-crowding, unemployment and lack of 
home and car ownership) using standard adjustments against popu-
lation stratification such as genetic PCs or linear mixed models and 
still find many genome-wide significant loci85.
Again, this does not mean that social outcomes like neighbour-
hood poverty are inevitable or determined by biology (Box 1). 
Rather, any social process that unequally concentrates educational 
and economic opportunity in some places, but not others, will 
induce geographical variation in genotypes, because people choose 
(or lack the capability to choose) their place of residence on the 
basis of their own genetically influenced preferences, abilities and 
characteristics. This coupling between genetics and geography com-
plicates efforts to draw causal inferences about how the characteris-
tics of places shape inequalities in health and other life outcomes86.
Gene × environment and gene × intervention interactions. 
Earlier iterations of gene × environment (G × E) interaction work, 
either using candidate genes or latent components of genetic vari-
ance estimated in a twin model, have been criticized for being vul-
nerable to bias and false positives14,87,88. Recent work to examine 
gene × intervention (G × I) interactions is a promising reinvigora-
tion of the more general G × E topic, as such work examines robust 
measures of genotype (for example, PGSs estimated from large-scale 
GWAS rather than candidate genes) and interventions that can be 
reasonably assumed to be exogenous (for example, policy shocks).
A G × I analysis can test whether intervention effects are larger 
or smaller for people who are genetically more likely to develop 
the outcome that is targeted by the intervention, thus address-
ing three key questions about the intervention: (i) does it serve a 
high-need population segment, (ii) will it shrink existing inequali-
ties or amplify them and (iii) can its delivery be personalized? 
For example, an intervention could be particularly impactful for 
people at high genetic risk, therefore shrinking inequalities by 
serving a high-need segment of the population. Alternatively, the 
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intervention could operate equivalently across levels of genetic 
risk, suggesting few potential gains from targeting the intervention 
to specific people on the basis of genetic characteristics (although 
including genetic information might improve the estimate of the 
intervention main effect, by accounting for residual heterogene-
ity44). Or the intervention could deliver the most benefit to those 
who are already at lower risk, a ‘Matthew effect’ that improves the 
average level of functioning in a population but also exacerbates 
inequalities89. This result would point to the need to develop new 
interventions for high-risk segments of the population90.
One of the recent studies of G × E showed that a policy reform 
in the UK that increased compulsory schooling by one year 
improved obesity-related health outcomes and lung function in 
mid-adulthood. The reform had particularly positive effects for 
individuals who carried more genetic risk factors for a high BMI, 
effectively reducing health disparities by counteracting genetic 
risks49. Beyond understanding the impact of that specific policy 
reform, this study is also valuable as a novel empirical illustration of 
an old idea: genetic differences between people do not necessarily 
restrict the possibilities for intervention91.
Part of the reason that genetic associations might be depen-
dent on environmental factors, for example, political regime, 
policy interventions, economic conditions or school environ-
ment, is that genetic differences might be expressed via modifi-
able, context-dependent environmental channels92,93. For example, 
genetic predispositions toward height and psychomotor speed could 
lead to self-selection into a sports club; the training and reinforce-
ment received by coaches, parents and peers, then, could amplify 
these initial differences to produce associations between genetic 
variants and basketball ‘talent’.94 In a different macro-environmental 
context, where these training and reinforcement experiences are not 
available (i.e., in a different ‘cafeteria of experience’95), genetic asso-
ciations would be disrupted.
Tracing these sorts of gene–environment interplays, in which 
people with different genotypes are systematically more likely to 
elicit different environmental responses, to select different peer 
groups, to engage in different training experiences and, more gen-
erally, to carve different environmental niches for themselves, has 
long been a topic of interest in the twin and family literature96–98, and 
we anticipate that research with PGSs will offer new opportunities 
for testing hypotheses in this area.
However, we also note some methodological challenges in 
estimating G × E and G × I interactions. First, PGS are typically 
constructed from large-scale GWAS results that estimate the aver-
age effects of SNPs across samples and environments, missing or 
attenuating potential environment-specific genetic effects. Second, 
PGS tend to capture only part of the relevant genetic influences on 
a trait54. For both of these reasons, G × E and G × I will be biased 
towards zero and provide only a lower bound estimate of the true 
effects. Third, because GWAS results are typically not immune to 
population structure, genetic nurture or other unobserved envi-
ronmental confounds (see above), PGS may capture some of the 
environmental causes of an outcome. And fourth, since genes and 
environments are often correlated, G × E and G × I may be endog-
enous terms in a regression equation. All of the above makes the 
interpretation of G × E and G × I interactions more difficult unless 
GWAS results from within-family analyses are used and combined 
with reasonably exogenous variations in E or I.
Implications of ‘disease’ genetics for social processes (and vice 
versa). GWAS is perhaps most commonly conceptualized as a tool 
for understanding the biology of psychiatric and physical diseases, 
and advocates for investing in GWAS often emphasize the relevance 
of results for drug development5,99. But genetic discoveries for ‘dis-
eases’ turn out to be relevant for a much broader array of social 
phenomena in ‘healthy’ or non-clinical populations. For example, 
genetic risks for physical health conditions, like coronary artery dis-
ease, are associated with long-term wealth, education and self-rated 
health in hold-out samples100. Similarly, the schizophrenia PGS is 
associated with the escalation of illicit drug use in typically develop-
ing university students101.
Conversely, genetic discoveries for ‘healthy’ phenotypes can be 
useful for understanding medical and psychiatric diseases. GWAS 
results for EA were used to parse the genetic heterogeneity of 
schizophrenia into disease subtypes with different genetic archi-
tectures and biological underpinnings, which might benefit from 
different treatments50. As another example, the first robust genetic 
associations with major depressive disorder (MDD) among indi-
viduals of European descent were found using self-reports of sub-
jective well-being and neuroticism as proxy-phenotypes36,102. Recent 
multivariate work has investigated the joint genetic architecture 
of a ‘well-being spectrum’ encompassing depression, neuroticism, 
life satisfaction and positive affect38. The genetics of subjective 
well-being have also been leveraged to understand its relationship 
to cardiometabolic health and body size103. These results demon-
strate that there is no clear boundary between social science genet-
ics and medical genetics: investments in either area of research will 
enrich the other (Fig. 4).
Conclusion
The rapidly increasing availability of genetic data now allows sci-
entists to unravel the genetic underpinnings of individual differ-













• Social science variables correlated with case status
• Cheap, easy measurement allows very large N
• Jointly analyze multiple traits
• Detect cross-cutting genetic risks
• Parse genetic heterogeneity in diseases
• PGSs as covariates to improve power and to control for otherwise unobservable factors
• GIV regression
• Mendelian randomization and extensions
• Intergenerational transmission (e.g., using genotyped trios)
Fig. 4 | How medical science can benefit from social science genetics. The figure displays relationships between genetic epidemiology and social science 
genetics. GIV, genetic instrumental variable.
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ences in social, behavioural and health outcomes. Although not 
without caveats, the current workhorses of statistical genetics (e.g., 
GWAS, LD score regression, polygenic scores) are useful for social 
scientists whose primary interests lie in understanding effects of 
environments, such as parenting, policies or interventions, that 
might lead to or entrench inequalities. Genetic effects influence 
most dimensions of individual differences that social scientists care 
about, and genetic differences between people are tightly interwo-
ven with environmental differences that social scientists study. 
This is both a challenge as well as an opportunity for the social 
science: ignoring the relevance of genes would mean ignoring an 
important part of reality, which could lead to erroneous and mis-
leading conclusions about environmental or behavioural effects. 
Thus, the social sciences are incomplete without genetics, and they 
can benefit from genetically informed study designs in their quest 
for accurate and comprehensive answers to the questions they are 
asking. The tools and data to do so keep emerging at a rapid pace. 
Now is the time to begin training social scientists to understand 
and use these new tools.
Clearly, the genetic revolution raises a host of new ethical, social 
and legal challenges that are important and urgent to address. 
Genetic data are possibly the most personal piece of information 
about an individual that exist, and the scope of potential uses and 
abuses is rapidly increasing, ranging from ‘genetic entertainment’ 
by learning about one’s ancestry or creating ‘customized’ music 
playlists, to potential applications in insurance and labour markets, 
marketing campaigns, dating apps, criminal justice proceedings, 
the testing and selection of embryos during in vitro fertilization, to 
biohacking and engineered differences in human DNA. The genetic 
revolution will change our lives and our societies, whether or not 
we want it to. As social scientists, we have expertise in considering 
the ethical, cultural, political, economic, environmental and histori-
cal forces that shape human lives and societies. As a consequence, 
we can make valuable contributions to the unfolding conversation 
about the uses and abuses of human genomics. But to do so, we need 
to take genetics seriously.
Data availability
The genetic correlations reported in Fig. 1 are based on publicly 
available GWAS summary statistics on LDHub (http://ldsc.broadin-
stitute.org/ldhub/). The Health and Retirement Study data in Fig. 3 
can be accessed via dbGaP and the University of Michigan.
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